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Melchert (2016) argues that knowledge of psychological processes is now grounded in 
experimental tests of falsifiable theories that support a unified, paradigmatic understanding 
of human psychology. While his argument for leaving behind our preparadigmatic past of 
competing theoretical orientations is welcome, Melchert (2016) presents a perspective in 
which the degree to which this is currently possible is overstated. In this comment it is 
argued that scientific research does not replace paradigmatic assumptions but takes place 
within them.  As such, it is not possible to take the theoretical orientations out of the 
practice of psychology, which is inevitably an expression of our philosophical assumptions of 
first principles. 
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Melchert (2016) begins his article by commenting critically on the proliferation of 
theoretical orientations.  He notes that the problem of irreconcilable theoretical 
orientations has long been recognised.  One of the reasons for this, he says, is that 
traditional theoretical orientations are based on philosophical assumptions of first 
principles, for example, the biologically based drives in Freudian theory, the blank slate of 
behaviourism, and the self-actualizing tendency of Rogerian theory (for an overview of 
these theories, see Joseph, 2010).  Melchert’s (2016) argument is that we are now in the 
position to replace these conflicting theoretical orientations with a unified paradigmatic 
scientific understanding. Falsifiability and scientific precision have led to replicated and well-
controlled research and thus new understanding.  With these new understandings the 
traditional theoretical orientations can, Melchert (2016) argues, be left behind, allowing 
professional psychology to move forward as a unified science. The aim of this comment is to 
put forward the counter argument for why the traditional theoretical orientations cannot be 
left behind.   
 All research has an ontological stance. Because psychological researchers do not 
always articulate their philosophical first assumptions does not mean that they don’t have 
them. Research is not outside looking in at these orientations but is itself an expression of a 
particular orientation. The choice of constructs that are operationalised, the mechanisms 
that are hypothesised to underpin change, are not detached from theoretical orientations, 
but arise from them (see, Nafstad, 2015). As such, professional practice even when based 
on scientific research cannot be disconnected from the philosophical assumptions of first 
principles.  All professional psychology promotes a vision of human nature, either implicitly 
or explicitly.   
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 As an example, recently we have seen the challenge to clinical psychology that its 
science is based on an an illness ideology that has outlived its usefulness and been to the 
detriment of the profession and the people it serves (Maddux & Lopez, 2015). What may 
have seemed like a unified clinical science is increasingly understood to be grounded in a 
theoretical orientation that ultimately has its roots in Freudian theory. It was this argument 
that led Seligman to champion positive psychology as an alternative to what he saw as the 
‘rotten-to-the-core’ view common to Western thought and academia (Seligman, 2003), 
echoing the challenge from humanistic psychology to psychoanalysis decades before 
(Rogers, 1963).  
 For some it may seem perplexing why many psychologists seem to prolong these 
therapy wars, but the reason is that these philosophical assumptions of first principles 
define the therapy, whether it is to control and restrict, mould and shape, or empower and 
free people - to describe the implications of the biologically based drives in Freudian theory, 
the blank slate of behaviourism, and the self-actualizing tendency of Rogerian theory, 
respectively.  That is to say, all professional psychology takes one of these stances.  It is 
simply an escapable fact of clinical practice that how we decide to interact with another 
person rests on our philosophical assumptions of first principles. Practitioners of these 
traditional theoretical approaches choose them, by and large, because they understand that 
these are the options and they think their choice of theoretical orientation already offers 
the most valid unified view. 
 A clinical science in which there was universal agreement on philosophical 
assumptions of first principles would be desirable. But to achieve this it must first be 
possible to either reconcile the different philosophical assumptions of first principles, 
develop an alternative, or choose between them. But as a scientific question we are no 
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further to understanding whether human nature is characterised by biologically based 
drives, the blank slate, or the self-actualizing tendency, or even how to definitively answer 
this question. These are philosophical assumptions of first principles that are not directly 
accessible to observation and measurement.  Evolutionary theory does not provide support 
for a unified clinical science as Melchert (2016) suggests.  Any theory that is incompatible 
with evolutionary theory must be questioned, but a case can equally well be made for the 
compatibility of each of the traditional theoretical orientations.  Proponents of each will 
differentially interpret evidence regarding the characteristics that people have been 
endowed with through evolution and which characteristics are the product of human nature 
and which are the result of culture.  
 Until we are able to provide a definite answer to the question of philosophical first 
assumptions it needs to be recognized that the practice of psychology is likely influenced by 
cultural conceptions and the values and ideals which prevail in society at any time and how 
that shapes the nature of psychological science (van Drunen & Jansz, 2004). Clinical science 
is important for professional psychology but it needs to be recognised that professional 
practice even when based on scientific research cannot be disconnected from the 
philosophical assumptions of first principles.  
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